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Abstract
This thesis presents IntuiSec, a framework for intuitive user interaction with Smart
Home security. The design approach of IntuiSec is to introduce a layer of indirection
between user-level intent and the system-level security infrastructure. This layer
is implemented by a collection of distributed middleware and user-level tools. It
encapsulates system-level security events and exposes only concepts and real-world
metaphors that are intuitive to non-expert users. It also translates user intent to
the appropriate system-level security actions. The IntuiSec framework presents the
user with intuitive steps for setting up a secure home network, establishing trusted
relationships between devices, and granting temporal, selective access for both home
occupants and visitors to devices within the home. The middleware exposes APIs
that allow other applications to present the user with meaningful visualizations of
security-related parameters and concepts. I present the IntuiSec system design and
an example proof-of-concept implementation, which demonstrates the user experience
and provides more insight into the framework.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Increasing numbers of network-capable devices and an unabated growth in global
inter-connectivity are marking a clear path toward pervasive, networked computing.
This, combined with the fact that the rate of malware infections has been not only
rising, but constantly accelerating over the past two decades shows that there is a
clear need to critically readdress the design of secure systems.
Traditionally, computer security has been a high priority only for entities deal-
ing with extremely sensitive data, such as the military, the government, and banks.
Information Technology (IT) experts in each individual branch or institution were
able to configure and manage their own internal security mechanisms. However as
network-capable consumer devices become more powerful and prevalent, average con-
sumers are growing more reliant on these devices for transactions involving increasing
amounts of personal information - such as bank account and credit card details.
Yet despite this, most users are still perplexed by the cumbersome experiences
of configuring and managing their application, device, and network security settings.
One particular domain where this issue is being brought to the forefront is that of
wireless security. Estimates vary however most analysts seem to agree that 60 to 70
percent of home wireless networks have no security at all [1]. This situation will only
exacerbate as the number of home networks grows rapidly from 37 million worldwide
in 2003 to a projected 111 million in 2008, according to market advisory firm IDC
[2].
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Concomitant to this increase in wireless proliferation is a tangible movement
towards ubiquitous computing whereby users are surrounded with a multitude of
network-capable devices that gather information, provide services, and communicate
with each other. This will take place even within individual homes transforming what
is currently a, simple home network consisting of a handful of devices into a substan-
tially more complex Smart Home. If the average user finds the security of today's
relatively simple home networks arduous to configure and maintain, then surely the
arrival of the Smart Home will substantially add to the burden.
1.1 A Different Approach to User Interaction with
Security
This significant change in status quo requires a paradigm shift in the design of secure
systems for user-oriented environments. The average consumer cannot be expected
to interact with security in the ways that IT experts traditionally have and most
current systems are not designed with non-expert users in mind. Recently, some
attempts have been made to improve this situation. However many such attempts
involve improving the graphical user interface (GUI) while still forcing the user to
interact directly with low-level security parameters, such as Wired Equivalent Privacy
(WEP) keys and Medium Access Control (MAC) address filters. These attempts
are inadequate as they still directly expose average users to complicated underlying
security mechanisms.
Rather than redesigning the lower level cryptographic protocols, which are nec-
essarily complex and accomplish their goals of (among other things) securing and
verifying data, I argue that there is a need for a level of abstraction between system-
domain security functionality and user-level actions and intent. This abstraction must
be bi-directional, as shown in Figure 1-1. It must encapsulate system-level security
events in such a way that comprehensible notifications can be presented to the user
and it must also do the reverse by translating user-level intent into the appropriate
16
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Figure 1-1: Layer of abstraction between system-domain security and user-domain
applications
system-level actions. Furthermore, the abstraction must be applicable across a va-
riety of possible underlying security mechanisms so as to provide a consistent user
experience when interacting with security.
To demonstrate adoption of this strategy, I present a framework that accomplishes
the aforementioned goals for a specific application domain. The framework is named
IntuiSec (INTUItive SECurity) and is based on research done at both MIT and the
Nokia Research Center (NRC) [3] [4] [5]. It consists of a middleware, user-level tools,
and lower-level security mechanisms. The user tools use Application Programming
Interfaces (APIs) exposed by the middleware to present the user with a consistent and
comprehensible interaction with the underlying security mechanisms. These APIs
are meant to help applications provide implicit security whereby low-level security
functionality is hidden from the user and the applications can focus on the user's
goals rather than forcing the user to deal with complicated security functionality.
Furthermore, the framework creates a separation of policy from mechanism since
the underlying security mechanisms may change whilst the higher level policies may
remain the same. Note that no changes are made to the underlying cryptographic
algorithms. IntuiSec uses widely adopted security mechanisms, such as public key
cryptography, symmetric encryption, and hashing algorithms.
17
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1.2 Application Domain and Motivation
IntuiSec is designed with a specific application domain in mind - the Smart Home.
The IntuiSec Smart Home may have both wired and wireless connectivity and it may
contain one or more occupants. Each of these occupants wishes to protect his or her
own devices from unauthorized use and wants to be able to grant selective, temporal
use of their devices to both home residents and visitors. Collectively all occupants
want to protect the home network from external unauthorized connectivity. The In-
tuiSec framework presents the user with intuitive steps for bootstrapping new devices
onto the home network, establishing trusted relationships between devices, and grant-
ing temporal, selective access for both home occupants and visitors to devices within
the home. The middleware exposes APIs that allow other applications to present the
user with meaningful visualizations of security-related parameters and concepts. The
framework does not impose restrictions on exactly how such concepts are presented,
although the implementation described in this thesis demonstrates how the APIs may
be leveraged to display meaningful representations.
A motivating example of this application domain can be seen in the initiatives be-
ing proposed by the Digital Living Network Alliance (DLNA). This large consortium
of companies over a variety of technology industries is standardizing the interoper-
ability of wired and wireless devices in the home. They have already released several
specifications that are now being incorporated into consumer devices [6].
Furthermore, the use of mobile devices plays a central role in the user interaction
processes described in this thesis. Specifically, cell phones have become the most
widespread consumer device with over 2 billion subscribers in 2005 and a projected
3.2 billion in 2010 [7]. This means that not only are they pervasive, but they are
also personal, meaning an individual does not usually share regular use of his mobile
phone with another person. Mobile phones also have significant storage and computa-
tional capabilities, with support for short range wireless and near-field communication
options. This combination of features makes them prime candidates for use as con-
trol devices within Smart Homes. Several key aspects of the IntuiSec framework are
18
designed with this in mind.
1.3 Contributions
This thesis introduces several novel approaches in addressing the issue of user inter-
action with security frameworks in Smart Home environments:
* Creation of a bi-directional layer of indirection to translate between user-level
intent and system-level security actions in the Smart Home. This layer of indi-
rection is not restricted to a specific set of underlying security mechanisms - it
exposes consistent API's despite varying lower level security protocols.
" Introduction of abstracted security tickets known as Passlets which are user-
perceived entities that encapsulate access control parameters to be distributed
from one user to another. Passlets incorporate both connectivity-level security
information and device-level authorization parameters thereby allowing config-
uration on both levels to take place in one easy step.
" Creation of a key-rotation mechanism for connectivity-level wireless security
whereby access points rotate shared cryptographic secrets regularly and devices
are given an ordered sequence of valid secrets. The length of the distributed
sequence is determined by the duration of authorized connectivity allowing for
automatic termination of connectivity access without the need for manual re-
vocation.
* Implementation of a working system that demonstrates the framework's func-
tionality on the Series 60 mobile phone platform and the Linux platform within
a simulated Smart Home environment.
1.4 Organization
This thesis begins with a summary of related work in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 gives
introductory information needed in order to appreciate the remainder of the thesis.
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Following this in Chapter 4 I give a detailed description of the design of the framework.
In that section I also explain the security model that applies to IntuiSec. Chapter 5
describes my implementation of the IntuiSec framework on Nokia Series 60 cellular
phones and Linux laptops in a simulated smart home environment. Finally, in Chapter
6 I conclude and offer suggestions for further work.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
IntuiSec is the result of research in three main disciplines: Security, Human Computer
Interaction (HCI), and Smart Spaces. While there are many publications in each
field individually, it is more meaningful and relevant for the purposes of this thesis
to look at work that fits into some combination of the three. Thus I will begin by
describing publications on user interaction with security, followed by publications
on user interaction with smart spaces, followed by publications on security in smart
spaces, and finally I will present publications covering all three disciplines.
2.1 User Interaction with Security
One approach in this domain has been to critically examine the usability of existing
applications and technologies with respect to security. In [8], Whitten and Tygar
perform a rigorous analysis on Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) and conclude that while
it was intended to provide a global framework for securing and authenticating emails,
it did not meet their usability requirements. A study was conducted on users in
which they found that only three out of twelve test subjects successfully managed to
use PGP to encrypt and decrypt email. Similar conclusions are reached in [9] where
Zurko et. al. examined user behavior when presented with security question pop-ups
during workflow while using the Lotus Notes application. They conclude that almost
half of the users make the 'wrong choice' and let the insecure content run. The Kazaa
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peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing application is looked at in [10] and found to fail in its
handling of privacy related functionality. Users inadvertently share information and
files that they would like to keep private.
Other researchers have focused on more general aspects of security usability rather
than examining specific applications. In [11], Dourish et. al. conducted a series of
qualitative interviews at both an academic institution and an industrial research lab.
They found that "neutral to negative attitudes dominated the end-user experience of
security technologies" and whilst not focusing on ubiquitous computing as such, they
recognize the increased complexity and urgency of creating usable security frameworks
for pervasive computing. Yet more papers examine the relationship between usability
and security in an attempt to create general design guidelines [12][13].
A separate series of studies from University College in London explores the inter-
action between users and passwords highlighting the deficiencies of password-based
systems and making recommendations for improvement [14][15]. As a result, several
other designs using alternative forms of authentication have been suggested [16][17].
Researchers tend to agree that usability needs to be factored into the design of
a system from the start. One interesting question raised in the literature is whether
security can and should be retro-fitted onto existing systems that have proven to
be usable, or whether a system should be designed with security in mind from the
start. In [18], Gutmann et. al. argue the case for post hoc security noting that most
successful secure applications were previously insecure, such as Skype, Gnutella, Bit
Torrent, and even Secure Shell (SSH) which added encrypted connections onto the
existing user experience of the telnet application. Others also highlight the success of
SSH in providing implicit security whereby a user takes application-level actions that
are automatically coupled with security actions [19]. In a rare positive comment on
existing solutions, they mention technologies that they believe are "getting it right",
such as the identity-based encryption scheme by Boneh and Franklin whereby one
can encrypt messages using public strings like email addresses [20].
Another point that researchers make is the importance of presenting the user with
appropriate visualizations in order to make informed decisions related to security [21].
22
DiGioia and Dourish take a novel approach in this regard leveraging social navigation
to present more meaningful visualizations to the user [22].
Finally there is some work that presents more concrete attempts at creating ap-
plications with a more usable interaction with security, but these are more recent.
One such example is SPARCLE, a "set of privacy utilities that are intended to as-
sist organizations with the creation, implementation, and internal auditing of privacy
policies" [23].
Besides the above academic approaches, the issue of security usability has at-
tracted a lot of interest in the industry, especially in the domain of wireless network-
ing. There are two main initiatives worth noting: Buffalo Technology's AirStation
OneTouch Secure System (AOSS) [24] and Linksys' SecureEasySetup (SES), which
was adopted from Broadcom [25]. Both technologies promise quick and easy setup
of secured wireless networks and have similar user interfaces despite using different
underlying security mechanisms. Currently there is an effort by the Wifi Alliance to
standardize this process using non-proprietary means.
2.2 User Interaction with Smart Spaces
There are several papers that give an overview of current research relating to smart
spaces and present the various challenges that designers face when creating products
for these environments [26][27][28]. The 'Intelligent Room' is one such environment
which uses artificial intelligence (AI) techniques with video cameras and microphones
to perform facial recognition, speech recognition, and gesture tracking [29]. On the
other hand in [30], Connelly and Khalil present a framework whereby spaces and
devices communicate with each other to perform policy resolution. Devices are then
automatically configured to adhere to the resolved policy. Katsuno and Aihara take a
different approach by separating a device into a mobile core and a fixed cradle. They
propose an autonomic network configuration technology that enables these mobile
cores to discover information about the network and configure the settings accordingly
[31].
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2.3 Security in Smart Spaces
Again in this field there are several papers that given an overview of current research
[32] [33]. Campbell et al. take this one step further in [34] by also presenting their own
prototype implementation to address some of these issues. One approach to security
in smart spaces is to use a set of environment variables to create an environment role
which then dictates the access control to various resources [35]. Another framework
has been proposed to manage key distribution at the link level [36]. Both these
approaches use a centralized server.
2.4 User Interaction with Security in Smart Spaces
The overall scope of this thesis involves work in all three fields - usability, security, and
smart spaces. Hence research that combines these three areas is the most relevant.
However it is also the most rare. In [37], the authors present a framework that uses
trust levels in order to establish access control. Users are assigned levels of trust by
the appliances. The description of how this is done is quite high level and it does not
address security on the lower connectivity levels.
Others leverage location limited channels (LLC's) as part of their frameworks.
In [38], Balfanz et al. describe their "Network in a Box" which uses the infrared
port of a laptop to auto-configure the laptop's wireless network security settings.
Another illustrative example is given in [39] where LLC's are used to exchange public
key information between a laptop and a printer in an airport lounge. This then
allows the laptop to securely print to that specific printer over SSL or TLS. They
follow up on this research in [40] where they describe five usability lessons learned
from conducting an experiment with two different methods of setting up a public
key infrastructure (PKI) based wireless network. The first method involved users
performing manual configuration of their devices and the second involved using the
infrared method described earlier. Their results showed that it took users an average
of 140 minutes to configure their devices manually and only 1 minute and 39 seconds
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using the LLC-based auto-configuration method. All the participants were computer
literate, typically with a PhD in computer science.
Holmstr6m takes a different approach in [41] using the metaphor of a business
card to delegate permissions between individuals. The example given there is grant-
ing your colleague permission to read your email while you are away. The framework
presented uses Simple PKI certificates as these do not rely on a hierarchy of certi-
fication authorities thereby addressing the scalability problems of traditional X.509
identity certificates.
Lastly, it is important to describe work done by the Universal Plug and Play
(UPnP) Forum on home network security. The forum consists of a large number
of companies across a wide range of technology industries and is strongly supported
by DLNA which has adopted their standards for interoperability within the Smart
Home. The security aspect is one component of the larger UPnP Device Architecture
that was standardised and adopted by the Forum in 2003. The security framework
proposed by the Forum is specific to the Smart Home environment. It introduces a
Security Console which is a software component that handles the 'client-side' of the
security protocols. These Security Consoles are the identity-bearers in the home and
not users. The Device Security component handles the 'server-side' of the security
interaction. The framework uses existing notions of certificates to grant access to
devices. It however does not account for granting of connectivity access and the
different connectivity mechanisms that a device may use to join a home network.
Their proposals also do not focus on the framework's usability, which is clearly a key
element of any Smart Home network infrastructure. Their work is best outlined in
[42]. For a more detailed technical description, see [43], [44], and [45].
25
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Chapter 3
Design Rationale
3.1 Security Model and Threats
IntuiSec is intended to operate in a Smart Home environment. An example of a Smart
Home is a house with both wired and wireless connectivity that contains numerous
devices providing various services to users in the home. Such devices could be media
servers, audio/visual (A/V) renderers, refrigerators - or any household appliance or
consumer electronics device, as depicted in Figure 3-1. Currently many of these
devices are not yet network-capable, but the technology to make them so is available
and there are various initiatives strongly advocating for such adoption in the near
future. For an example of such an initiative, see the Digital Living Network Alliance
(DLNA) at [6].
Smart Homes are likely to have several occupants. IntuiSec assumes that each
occupant would like to protect the privacy of her own devices whilst being able to grant
selective access to other individuals as she sees fit. Collectively as a home, IntuiSec
assumes that the occupants would like to prevent unauthorized non-home occupants
from gaining any access to the home network; this includes even connectivity access,
such as the ability to acquire an IP address and passively read network traffic. IntuiSec
also works under the assumption that home occupants would like to be able to grant
visitors access to devices within their homes for temporary periods of time.
Thus the threats that IntuiSec aims to protect against are:
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Figure 3-1: An Example of the IntuiSec Smart Home
1. Unauthorized connectivity access to the home network through any means -
Bluetooth, 802.11, etc.
2. Unauthorized access to services on a device in the home by anyone that has not
been granted permission to access it by the owner of that device
To address these threats, the access control provided by IntuiSec takes place on
two levels:
1. Connectivity Level - prevents unauthorized devices from connecting to the
home network
2. Service / Device Level - prevents already connected users from accessing
device functionality for which they are not authorized and allows users to
reliably authenticate the devices they are interacting with.
In terms of protecting against unauthorized connectivity access, IntuiSec focuses
on wireless connectivity. Gaining illicit wired access is seen as a much less significant
threat to home network security than gaining access over a wireless connection since
28
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the intruder must have physical access to the home in order to connect over a wire -
i.e. they must break into a person's home before they can attach a malicious device
with a wire. A device that is attached by wire is also more noticeable than a person
snooping over a wireless connection and so could more easily be detected and removed.
Furthermore, if an intruder does happen to acquire unauthorized wired connectivity
to the home, he or she will still not be able to access the services offered by any of
the home devices due to the second layer of protection at the service level.
IntuiSec is not intended to protect a household against the most advanced adver-
sary. Its aim is to provide a strong level of protection for average users in a smart
home environment and to do so in an intuitive manner. The framework presents
a shift in the design of secure systems and with this it hopes to both decrease the
number of unprotected wireless home networks and to provide a foundation for smart
home security frameworks. It does not aim to redesign existing cryptographic al-
gorithms; it leverages them as part of the framework. IntuiSec assumes platform
security when storing sensitive data on devices and it trusts manufacturers to ensure
that their devices are not pre-shipped with malicious software.
3.2 Use Cases
This section presents several basic use cases for user interaction with security in the
Smart Home. The scenarios are presented in the context of a household with two
occupants - Saad and Dimitris.
The first use case involves bootstrapping new devices into the Smart Home. When
Saad or Dimitris purchases a new device, they would like it to obtain permanent
connectivity to the Smart Home network over a secure channel. At the same time they
would like to protect their home from being accessed by non-authorized users. Figure
3-2 illustrates this. The process for achieving this would ideally be straightforward,
consistent, and intuitive, which is clearly not the case with today's methods of dealing
WEP keys, MAC address filters, etc.
Once the devices are connected and can all communicate with each other securely,
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Saad and Dimi tis' Smart Home
Figure 3-2: The Secure Smart Home
Saad would like to prevent Dimitris from accessing his devices until he explicitly grants
him access. He could also opt to have his devices have some default level of access to
everybody. By way of example, Saad purchases a new media server whose content he
wishes to keep private. Both Saad and Dimitris jointly purchased the A/V renderer
in the living room so they both have access to it by default. Thus Saad can now
stream content from his media server and display it on the A/V renderer, however
Dimitris cannot. Figure 3-3 illustrates this.
Dimitris later decides that he wants to play some music from the server and asks
Saad to give him access. Saad agrees, but he only wants to give Dimitris permission
to stream music and not movies from the server. He does not want him to access any
other file types or to upload or delete anything. Figure 3-4 illustrates the situation
after Saad grants Dimitris limited access to his media server.
A further use case involves granting temporary access to visitors for use of spe-
cific services in the Smart Home. Again, by way of example, the fridge in Saad and
Dimitris' home breaks down. The repairman comes over but by default is not even
able to connect to and browse their home network. However, Saad grants the repair-
man access for the day to selected functionality provided by the fridge so that he can
perform the necessary repairs. At the end of the day, once the work is complete, the
repairman automatically loses all access to Saad and Dimitris' Smart Home network.
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31
0Figure 3-5: The repairman's access while fixing the fridge
Figure 3-5 shows the repairman's access during the day.
3.3 Design Goals
The overall design goal of IntuiSec is to provide a usable framework through which
non-expert users can securely create and manage complex Smart Home environments
regardless of the underlying security mechanisms. In this light, the framework should
have the following functionality:
Bootstrapping - the framework should enable users to easily add new devices into
the Smart Home without the need to be directly exposed to a variety of tedious
and counter-intuitive security mechanisms.
Authenticating - the framework should enable users to easily establish trusted
relationships between devices. This is similar to the concept of trusted websites
on the Internet.
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Controlling Access - the framework should enable users to easily provide other
users with various levels of access control to devices that they own. This access
may be temporary and the user should not be forced to manually revoke the
permissions when the desired access time has expired. From the user's perspec-
tive, the process of granting these permissions should be identical regardless of
whether the recipient is a home occupant or a visitor. However visitors should
also be automatically given the necessary connectivity parameters to connect
securely over wireless connections to the Smart Home. Devices that belong to
home occupants do not require the connectivity security parameters since they
will have already obtained them through the Bootstrapping process.
Visualizing Security - the framework should enable users to visualize the various
security relationships and parameters by abstracting them to fit into concepts
that they are already familiar with. For example, users are already familiar
with the concept of keys to unlock the front door to their home. It should be
feasible to incorporate such concepts into the framework.
3.4 Assumptions
IntuiSec makes certain assumptions. These are listed and discussed here:
" There exists some form of near field communications (NFC) channel on every
device. This is a strong assumption, however with the decreasing costs and
increased proliferation of RFID technology, it is fair to assume that a large
number of devices will incorporate some type of NFC capability in the near
future.
* Communications over NFC's are very difficult (though not impossible) to eaves-
drop on. It is very difficult for an adversary to capture information transferred
over NFC's due to the short range of communication (e.g. a few centimeters for
passive RFID tags). In addition, given the home environment in which IntuiSec
is designed to function, this scenario is even more unlikely.
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" Communications over NFC's are authentic. Any information obtained over an
NFC channel is authentic information coming from the device in question. In
the unlikely case that an adversary attempts to manipulate this connection, it
will be readily detectable.
" Platform Security. This assumption states that each device's on-board software
is responsible for maintaining the integrity and privacy of data stored on the
device. This means that information used by IntuiSec is stored in restricted
areas of the filesystem that only authorized users may access.
" Out-of-the-box hardware and software are trustworthy. IntuiSec does not aim to
prevent against malware that comes pre-shipped with either device hardware
or software.
" Some distributed middleware with a request/response framework exists. IntuiSec
does not provide functionality for service discovery or device manipulation over
the network. However it assumes such a framework exists in the context of the
Smart Home and that such a framework can leverage IntuiSec for its security
requirements.
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Chapter 4
Design
4.1 Design Concepts and Nomenclature
Before progressing further, it is important that the reader understands certain con-
cepts and terminology that are used in the remainder of this thesis. I define them in
this section for easy reference.
4.1.1 Device Types
There are several different types of devices in the IntuiSec Smart Home. Home
Devices are devices which have common knowledge of the Home Secret. This
secret is given to a Home Device when the user 'unlocks' the home network for it.
The procedure for unlocking the home network is part of the Easy Setup process
described in Section 4.2 and may be performed using a physical object reminiscent
of a key. The key that may be used is named the PhyKey (a PHYsical KEY as
opposed to the virtual keys used in cryptography).
There are several properties that all Home Devices share:
* Home Devices have permanent connectivity access to the home network.
" Home Devices are the only devices that can be used to allow Visitor Devices
to access the home network and to selectively use some of the home services
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Home Devices are further divided into three different types:
1. Infrastructure Devices, such as Access Points (APs) and gateways. These
devices provide network connectivity to other devices within the home.
2. Mobile Devices, such as cellular phones and Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs).
These devices can be easily moved around and can therefore be used to touch
all three types of Home Devices.
3. Fixed Devices, such as fridges and microwaves. These devices cannot be
easily moved around and so cannot be used to touch other Fixed Devices or
Infrastructure Devices. A mobile intermediary can be used to touch one Fixed
Device and then another in order to securely transfer information between them,
as is done during the Easy Setup process described in Section 4.2.
Another important distinction to make between the various Home Devices is
whether or not a device is used to control and access specific services on the net-
work, or whether it is providing such services. Although not part of the framework,
IntuiSec assumes the existence of some underlying service discovery and control pro-
tocols. An example of such a suite of protocols is given by the UPnP architecture,
which has been chosen by DLNA as the standard for interoperable device communi-
cation within the Smart Home. I leverage this particular framework as part of the
implementation of IntuiSec described in Chapter 5. For more information on UPnP,
see [46].
A device used to control other devices is named a Control Point and a device
that provides services to the network is named a Provider. The same physical device
may be both a Control Point and a Provider. An example of this relationship is a
user using his cell phone as a Control Point to download content from a media server,
which is a Provider. Note that UPnP uses the term 'Device' to describe a Provider,
however I use the latter in this thesis as it reduces ambiguity.
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4.1.2 User Roles
The first user of a brand new device becomes its first Owner. This happens through
the Easy Setup process described in Section 4.2. Owners, by default, have full access
to any of the services on a device. Only an Owner can do the following:
" Grant permission to other users to access services offered by the device.
" Add other users to the device's Owner list
Users interact with Providers in the home through Control Points. When a user
logs onto a Control Point, any subsequent network requests are issued on behalf of the
currently logged on user. Therefore, it is users and not devices that are the initiators
of actions in the IntuiSec Smart Home. This enables a user's network privileges to
persist regardless of which device or Control Point she is using.
Users can be either Home Occupants or Visitors. Home Occupants are Own-
ers of at least one Home Device. They can selectively grant access to other Home
Occupants or Visitors for services on the devices that they own. Visitors are Owners
of Visitor Devices. These devices do not have knowledge of the Home Secret and so
do not have connectivity access to the home network by default. Visitors can only be
granted access to the home network and its services by a Home Occupant.
4.1.3 Secrets, Identities, and Cryptographic Keys
Each Home Device stores the Home Secret, which has the following properties:
" the HomeID is defined as the hash of the Home Secret and it is used to uniquely
identify the Smart Home (HomelD = hash(Home Secret)).
" The Home Secret may be distributed using the PhyKey or by other means such
as a manual input method. For a discussion of the PhyKey see section 4.2.2.
Each user is assigned a system-wide private/public keypair {UKpRI, UKPUB}
with the following properties:
37
" {UKpRI, UKPUB} may be generated using different mechanisms, such as a
username/password pair or biometric information. The most important prop-
erty of the keypair is that it is consistent throughout the system so that a
user can be properly identified regardless of the device she is using. A form of
identity based encryption (IBE), as described in [22] may also be used here to
generate a keypair.
" the UserID is defined as the hash of UKPUB (UserlD = hash(UKpUB)) and
it is used to uniquely identify each user in the framework.
" the UserID of the Owner of a device denotes that device's OwnerID
Each Provider has a unique private/public keypair {PKPRI, PKPUB} that is
pre-shipped with the device. This keypair has the following property:
* the ProviderlD is defined as the hash of PKPUB (ProviderlD = hash(PKpuB))
and it is used to uniquely identify Providers in the framework.
4.1.4 Touch Authentication Process (TAP)
Touching is a concept used extensively by the IntuiSec framework. The term TAP
is used to describe the user action of using a Mobile Device to touch another device.
The Mobile Device being used is known as the TAPing Device and the device that
is subsequently touched is known as the TAPed Device. During a TAP, the system
leverages some form of NFC to perform any of several security-related transactions,
such as the exchange of public keys, mutual verification of the Home Secret, transferal
of cryptographic secrets, etc. A Mobile Device may be used as an intermediary to
perform a TAP between two non-mobile devices, such as during the Easy Setup
process described in Section 4.2.
4.2 Easy Setup
IntuiSec aims to provide a "buy-plug-and-play" user experience as much as possible in
order to reduce the burden of security on users. When a user purchases a new device
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and wishes to bootstrap it for secure home networking, he performs three simple
steps. Figures 4-1 and 4-2 depict this process pictorially. Below is a more thorough
description of the process and a discussion highlighting several significant concepts.
Step 1: The user performs the imprinting process, by which the new device comes to
learn about its first Owner [47]. Figures 4-1 and 4-2 show a username/password
entry system, however this is not a requirement and the Owner may be im-
printed through other means such as a fingerprint reader, retina scanner, or
any other method that can uniquely identify a person. It is essential that this
information be consistent throughout the user's interaction with the system
so that their identity remains constant. The framework uses this user-specific
information to independently generate the user's key pair {UKpRI, UKPUB},
where Hash(UKpuB) = OwnerlD of the device.
Step 2: The user 'unlocks' the home network by transferring the Home Secret to the
device. This can be done with the insertion of the PhyKey, as shown in Figures
4-1 and 4-2, however the use of a PhyKey is not a requirement. It could be that
the user is prompted to input the Home Secret manually. See Section 4.2.2 for
the rationale behind using the PhyKey
Step 3: The final step of the Easy Setup process requires the user to TAP an Infrastruc-
ture Device in order to acquire the necessary link level security parameters to
connect to the Home Network. If the TAPing device is a Home Device, trans-
fer of the connectivity security parameters is then done over a location limited
channel using some form of NFC, such as infrared or RFID. If the device being
set up is a Fixed Device, then an already bootstrapped mobile intermediary
may be used to perform this third step by TAPing the Fixed Device as in Fig-
ure 4-2. If the device being set up is an Infrastructure Device then this step is
not required and the device may simply be plugged in to the home network. As
part of the TAP in this step, the device that is transmitting the connectivity
security information verifies that the device being set up is a Home Device by
prompting it to prove that it knows the Home Secret. There are several ways
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Figure 4-1: Easy Setup of a Mobile Device (e.g cellular phone)
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3 TAP
to do this, however a straightforward challenge-response protocol such as the
following is sufficient: the transmitting device can use the Home Secret to en-
crypt a random sequence of bytes known as a nonce and then send that nonce
to the device that is being set up. It is then up to the device being set up to
decrypt the nonce using the same Home Secret as a shared key and then send
back its plain-text form to the other device for verification.
After completion of the Easy Setup process, the newly set up device can be used
to securely connect to the home network. All bootstrapped Home Devices share the
following properties:
" All connections over wireless links will have connectivity-level security. Devices
that have not performed the Easy Setup process will not be able to connect by
default.
" Home Devices can disconnect and reconnect with no extra configuration re-
quirements
" Service and device discovery are now possible over the network
" All devices have at least one owner
4.2.1 Ordered List of Secrets and Key Rotation Mechanism
IntuiSec introduces a key rotation mechanism that improves both the usability and
the security of existing wireless solutions. The idea here is to introduce a software
layer that replaces the user interaction needed for creating and changing common
secrets or encryption keys in Smart Home environments. By automatically setting
the user-level secrets, this method removes the burden from non-expert users and
makes the configuration easy for them. At the same time it also becomes applicable
to a wide variety of underlying security systems, all of which support the concept of
a user-level common secret. This is illustrated in Figure 4-3. It also allows for time
delimited access control privileges that expire without the need for manual revocation.
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Figure 4-3: An illustration of how the ordered secrets mechanism interacts with
different wireless link-level security implementations
To accomplish this, IntuiSec introduces an algorithm to set and update user-level
common secrets based on an ordered list mechanism. According to this mechanism, an
ordered list of user-level common secrets is generated by the IntuiSec software running
on an Infrastructure Device. This list can be generated randomly using a seed selected
by the manufacturer of the device or entered by the user in the form of a password
or by using an RFID tag, etc. The device then selects the first secret in the list and
uses the manufacturer's selected mechanism to set the user-level common secret with
it. The Infrastructure Device periodically selects the next secret in the ordered list
and again sets the user-level common secret with it. When the Infrastructure Device
reaches the end of the ordered list, it generates a new list either automatically based
on a seed selected by the manufacturer or by prompting the user for a new password, a
new RFID tag etc. This is expected to happen infrequently because it is very feasible
to have lists containing, for example, 1000 secrets or more (e.g. with secrets of 16
bytes, the list would require 16 KB memory, which is readily available today even
in very inexpensive hardware). This means that even changing a secret every day,
the ordered list will be exhausted once approximately every 3 years in this example.
The process of renewing the entire ordered list could take place at any time if, for
example, the members of the Smart Home feel that the list has been compromised.
During Step 3 of the Easy Setup process, this list of ordered secrets is transferred
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to the device that is being set up. The newly setup device then stores this list and sets
the first secret in the list as the currently active secret. Every time the Infrastructure
Device changes the common secret, the other device momentarily loses access and will
have to sequentially move down the ordered list until it finds the current common
secret used by the AP in order to successfully reconnect. Unless the client device stays
disconnected for a long period of time (e.g. the user travels with the device away from
the network), the new secret will simply be the next one in the list and reconnection
will take place almost instantly. If it has exhausted the list of secrets without finding
the correct one, then the device can correctly assume that the Infrastructure Device
has progressed beyond the list of secrets that it obtained when it performed the Easy
Setup. It then notifies the user that a TAP is necessary to obtain a new list of secrets.
This scheme also allows users to easily grant temporary access to the Smart Home
network to visitor client devices. For example, if a user wants to give a visitor access
for three days and the Infrastructure Device is configured to change the common
secret every day, then IntuiSec transfers to the Visitor Device the current and the
two following secrets in the ordered list. This process is automatically incorporated
into the Passlet mechanism described in Section 4.4
4.2.2 Use of the PhyKey
Using a PhyKey in Step 2 of the Easy Setup process has several advantages over
manual password input methods. The first advantage is its ease of use: the user does
not need to know anything about the contents of the PhyKey. The user only needs to
know that inserting the PhyKey is part of what is required to make a device a Home
Device and that other devices which have not received the contents of the PhyKey
will not have permanent access to the home network.
The second advantage is that it is more flexible and secure. The contents of
the Home Secret can be anything since IntuiSec has total control over what these
contents are. One could argue that by having the user manually enter a password
instead of using the PhyKey, IntuiSec could then use that password as some type of
seed to generate the Home Secret. However this would restrict the number of possible
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Home Secrets to a relatively small and finite amount since passwords that are easy
to remember come from a subset of characters, numbers, and perhaps punctuation.
The more complex the password, the harder it is for the user to remember.
In addition, the PhyKey also provides an analogy to existing keys that people use
for their doors in the sense that the PhyKey 'unlocks' the home network, just like
the house key unlocks the front door. Since people are already accustomed to actions
such as unlocking their doors, they should find it easier to adopt these actions as
common practice when it comes to securing their home networks.
However, the issues that apply to someone losing the key to their home also
analogously apply to someone losing the PhyKey. If the PhyKey is lost and the home
occupants are worried that it fell into the hands of someone who knows where their
home is, a new one would have to be created with a different Home Secret. This will
prevent future intrusion by whoever is in possession of the lost PhyKey. Nevertheless
IntuiSec envisions that the PhyKey is placed in a drawer somewhere and is only seldom
taken out in order to bootstrap a new device into the home. Also, backup copies of
the PhyKey may be made just like copies of regular keys may be made. However,
to further protect against threats caused by losing the PhyKey, an additional step is
needed to finalize the Easy Setup process for both Mobile and Fixed Devices and this
step requires the user to be in physical proximity of a Home Infrastructure Device in
order for them to TAP it (step 3).
4.3 Trust Builder
Once the Home Devices are connected to the home network, they can proceed to
search for and discover each other. But how can the user trust devices that she has
discovered over the network using her Control Point? A device that claims to be
Saad's Printer may not in fact be the device it is claiming to be.
The concept of building trust between devices is used to allow the user to credibly
verify the identity of a device that she is communicating with over the network. When
browsing the web, certificates are used to enable a client to verify the identity of a
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remote server. When a client connects to a server, it requests a certificate from the
server in order to perform authentication. This certificate should be signed by one of
the trusted root Certificate Authorities (CA's) that come pre-installed with the client
web browser. The browser can then check the validity of this certificate by verifying
its signature against that of one of the root CA's that it knows about. For a more
detailed discussion on CA's, see [48].
In order to eliminate the need for CA's in the Smart Home, IntuiSec leverages the
inherent high level of security that NFC's provide compared with long distance net-
work connections. When communicating with a remote server, the user may be easily
tricked into communicating with a malicious middleman acting as the remote server.
This is known as a "Man-in-the-Middle Attack". However when communicating over
a location-limited channel, this threat is virtually non-existent, as described earlier
in Section 3.4.
NFC's also facilitate the use of touch as an intuitive method of establishing trusted
relationships with devices. The premise is that it is easier for a user to trust what
she has seen and touched, not something that she has never seen.
As also discussed in Section 3.4, IntuiSec assumes manufacturers do not ship
compromised hardware to the consumer. IntuiSec also trusts that the hardware will
maintain platform security. Given these assumptions and the elimination of the pos-
sibility of a Man-in-the-Middle Attack, IntuiSec considers information received over
NFC channels to be trusted information. This means a Control Point can obtain
trustworthy initial rendezvous information from a Provider through a TAP. The ren-
dezvous information may consist of several pieces of data, such as the Provider's
ProviderID, its OwnerID, and its HomeID. The network browsing application on the
Control Point that is used to discover and control devices on the network can then
use this information to display meaningful visualizations of these security parameters.
These visualizations may incorporate whether or not a device is a trusted device by
displaying a green background for trusted devices and a red background for devices
that are not trusted. Again, IntuiSec does not dictate how such visualizations are pre-
sented, however it provides the infrastructure to facilitate such a display. An example
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of how this information may be presented is given in Figure 4-10.
4.4 Passlets
Most current schemes for granting access to a resource over a network require the
user to perform some direct manipulation of access control configuration. The con-
figuration data could be in the form of an Access Control List (ACL), a list of MAC
addresses, or a number of other implementations. The mechanism could reside either
on the device itself or on some centralized third party entity, such as an authenti-
cation or authorization server. Furthermore, the quasi-static state of the settings is
often impractical for most common use cases, which involve granting of privileges for
a temporary period of time.
The process of granting access is in general cumbersome for non-expert users.
When user interaction is required, direct contact with security is not intuitive and
a better GUI design alone is usually not the solution [8] [10]. For example, assume
Alice comes over to Dimitris' and Saad's house and she wants to browse Saad's shared
pictures on his media server using her laptop over 802.11 wireless. Dimitris and
Saad, being security-conscious individuals, have protected their home network by
employing a MAC filter and 128-bit WEP encryption on their wireless AP. To grant
Alice connectivity access, Saad must first figure out what the MAC address of her
laptop is. He then has to connect to the AP's configuration page and manually enter
her laptop's MAC address into the "Allow" list. After that he must manually enter
the 128-bit WEP key or passphrase onto Alice's laptop. Now at this point, Saad
has only provided Alice with connectivity access to the wireless network and not
access to his shared pictures. To grant her access to his pictures under any modern
operating system such as Windows, OS X, or Linux, he has to log onto the device
where the folder is located and manually edit the shared settings of that folder. This
may involve even further complications such as the creation of an additional user
account specifically for Alice on the device. In addition to all this, if Alice came back
a few days later and secretly snooped around near Saad's house, she would most likely
47
still be able to connect to his home network and to access his pictures unless he has
manually revoked her access privileges. Clearly this is far from optimal.
As a major step in improving this scenario, IntuiSec introduces Passlets, which
are user-perceived entities that carry user-level intent. They behave like 'tickets' or
'passes' that give permission to the bearer to connect to the home network and use
a subset of services provided by a networked device, without requiring that device to
be configured in advance to do so. The user needs to know nothing of the underlying
security infrastructure, which in general can come in many different flavors. The
emphasis is to enforce implicit security allowing the user to focus on their goals and
to separate the mechanism of the underlying security infrastructure from the actions
or the policy of the user. Saad's goal in the above example is to allow Alice to access
his shared pictures for the duration of her visit. His goal is not to discover what the
MAC address of her laptop is, nor is it to manually configure ACL's that have to be
later on edited again in order to terminate Alice's access privileges.
Passlets are inspired by the concept of 'capabilities'. They allow users to intu-
itively grant access to other users to selectively use devices they own. The IntuiSec
Passlet mechanism includes:
* A middleware that provides a level of indirection between the user domain and
the security system domain. The middleware translates user-intent to system-
specific actions.
" User level tools to capture the user intent. They allow users to generate, trans-
fer, view and revoke Passlets for devices they own
4.4.1 User Interaction
To demonstrate the usability of Passlets, contrast the following steps which Saad
performs using IntuiSec with the aforementioned prevailing method of granting Alice
access to his shared pictures:
1. Using his cell phone or any other device that he owns, Saad browses through
his list of owned devices, selects the media server, and specifies the appropriate
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Figure 4-4: Saad using a Passlet to grant Alice temporary access to music on his
media server
parameters for the Passlet. Note that these parameters are meaningful on a
user-level, such as which folder he wishes to share, how long he wishes to share
it for, what level of access he wishes to give (read or write), etc.
2. Saad TAPs Alice's laptop.
See Figure 4-4 for a depiction of these steps pictorially. Alice is shown using
a mobile phone and not a laptop however the procedure is identical in either case
highlighting the consistency of IntuiSec's user interaction.
4.4.2 Example Passlet Designs
The internals of Passlets will vary depending on the underlying security mechanisms
that are being used and therefore IntuiSec does not dictate a single specific imple-
mentation of Passlets. However there are some general technical principles which are
common to all forms. Passlets are first digitally signed using the private key of the
owner of a device and then encrypted using the public key of the Provider (PKPUB)
for which the Passlet is being generated. This digital signature provides three levels
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of protection for the inner contents of a Passlet:
1. Authenticity - The recipient can verify that the sender is in fact who s/he claims
to be.
2. Integrity - The recipient can verify that the message has not been altered during
transmission.
3. Non-repudiation - The recipient can ensure that an identical message is not
sent again by a third party.
With only digital signing however, the contents may still be viewed by a third
party. To avoid this, a Passlet is encrypted with PKPUB of the Provider that the
Passlet is being generated for. This ensures additional privacy since only that Provider
may view the contents of the Passlet.
I now present several different examples of how a Passlet may in fact be imple-
mented. The first example illustrates how a Passlet destined for a home occupant
may be implemented. The subsequent three examples describe Passlets that are
granted to visitors. Passlets for visitors add an additional layer of complexity since
connectivity-level security information must also be incorporated into the Passlet.
Example 1
This example describes a Passlet that is sent from one home occupant to another.
This case is the simplest as both users already have the necessary security parameters
to connect to the home network. All that needs to be transmitted here is information
for access control to the Provider. A Passlet of this type is shown in Figure 4-5
followed by a description of its various parameters. As motivation for this type of
Passlet, recall the use case where Saad wants to grant Dimitris access to stream music
from Saad's media server.
UserID: The UserID of the user for whom the Passlet is being generated. This
would be Dimitris' UserID in the example use case.
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Figure 4-5: Passlet to be given to a home occupant
Permissions: The permissions that the recipient is being granted. This would be
'stream music files'.
Time: An expiry time or number of uses for this Passlet.
OwnerID: The OwnerID of the person generating the Passlet. In the example,
this would be Saad's UserID. It is included so that if a Provider has multiple
owners, then when it receives a Passlet it will be able determine which owner
has generated the Passlet in order to verify the digital signature. To eliminate
the need for this, a Provider could simply use trial and error with the public
keys of all the owners to see which one verifies, however this is computationally
more expensive and the OwnerID is not sensitive information as it is the hash
of the public key of the owner.
Other: Possible extra information
Example 2
This first example of a visitor Passlet works without any modifications to existing
out-of-the-box Bluetooth and 802.11 access points. The information that is sent in
the clear consists of some public and some sensitive information, which is why it is
preferred that this type of Passlet be transferred only through a secure mechanism
such as TAPing. Recall that TAPing involves the simple touching of one device
and another. A Passlet of this type is shown in Figure 4-6. Note that the inner
portion of this Passlet is identical to Example Passlet 1, however it contains additional
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Figure 4-6: Passlet for a visitor without requiring extra computation by the Access
Point
information that is sent in the clear and these are described below. As motivation for
this type of Passlet, recall the use case where Saad wants to grant Alice permissions
to view his shared pictures on his media server for the day.
The information that is sent in the clear is:
ProviderID: This is the ProviderID of the Provider that the Passlet is providing
access to. This would be the ProviderlD of Saad's Media Server in the example
use case.
HomeID: The HomeID of the home which the Provider is a part of.
Permissions: The permissions granted to the user. These are purely for the purposes
of the user's device knowing what privileges it is being granted in advance so
that any GUI's can be updated. These are identical to the signed permissions,
which are the ones that are actually used by the Provider to enforce access
control.
Time: The expiry time of the Passlet. Analogous to the situation with permissions,
the time here is identical to the signed time and is only used by the recipient's
device to inform the user when the Passlet is meant to expire.
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APD: The unique identifier of the connectivity access point. For Bluetooth and
802.11 access points this would be the hardware or MAC address.
AP secrets: These are the user-level secrets required to connect to the access point
with the specified AP-ID. For Bluetooth this could be a sequence of one or more
PINs that are used to establish a pairing between the device and the access
point. For 802.11 this could be a sequence of one or more WEP passphrases.
If intercepted, the APID combined with the AP secrets would allow an adversary
to establish connectivity with the home network. However, due to the additional layer
of protection, he would not be able to access any functionality at the Provider level.
He would still be able to monitor packets and perhaps flood the network or cause a
Denial of Service (DoS) attack. As such it is recommended that this type of Passlet
be sent through a TAP rather than over a long-distance channel. This would nearly
eliminate the chances of an adversary picking up the sensitive information.
Example 3
This type of Passlet, shown in Figure 4-7, adds an additional layer of protection on
top of the previous Passlet by encrypting the entire Passlet with the public key of the
user for whom the Passlet is destined. This would eliminate the threat of a passive
adversary learning the AP secrets. However, if the recipient user is not trustworthy
then she may decide to share these secrets with a potentially malicious third party
after decrypting the outer portion of the Passlet. Since this Passlet is encrypted with
UKPUB of the user that the Passlet is for, it does not have to be sent through a TAP.
Example 4
This type of Passlet, shown in Figure 4-8, is more secure than the previous example
since it encrypts its entire contents using the Home Secret. This means that the
recipient cannot decrypt the Passlet and so does not have access to any AP secrets.
However, this scheme requires a modified AP that supports Passlet decryption. When
a visitor attempts to access a device within the home, her device sends the Passlet to
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Figure 4-7: Passlet for a visitor - encrypted so as to prevent eavesdropping
the AP which decrypts it and ensures that the Passlet is valid. This verification can
be done by sending a Message Authentication Code (MAC) along with the Passlet
in order to establish authenticity and integrity. If the Passlet is valid then the AP
sends the user's device the current secret in order to connect to the home network
over an encrypted channel. After connecting to the network, the device then proceeds
to connect to the Provider in the same manner as in Example 3. A more intelligent
AP may even decouple the user authentication mechanism from the encryption key.
This way upon each subsequent attempt to connect, the AP authenticates the Visitor
using his UserID and checks that against a list of valid Passlets. If the Visitor has a
valid Passlet, then his device is sent the current secret and he is allowed to connect
securely to the home network.
4.4.3 Passlet Sessions
Passlet sessions are initiated when the bearer of the Passlet does not have an already
established Passlet session with a Provider and attempts to access its functionality.
The process through which this occurs is shown in Figure 4-9. Note that after the
initial unpacking and verification of the Passlet, shared session keys are created and
used for encrypting future communications as this is a less computationally intensive
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Figure 4-8: Illustration of the preferred Passlet design, which however requires a more
intelligent access point than those currently available
mechanism than using public key cryptography for each message. Note further that
this whole process is automated and requires no manual intervention on the part of
the user.
The Passlet session establishment process requires mutual authentication between
the Provider and the user. The Provider must authenticate the user in order to verify
that s/he is in fact the bearer of the given Passlet. The user must also authenticate
the Provider to ensure that s/he is not communicating with a malicious device. If this
step were not present, then such a malicious device may pretend to be the expected
Provider and through its interaction with the user obtain private information.
4.4.4 Passlet Revocation
Passlets can be manually revoked before their expiry time, but only by the creator of
the Passlet and using the same device on which the Passlet was originally generated.
The latter constraint is necessary since the user may own multiple devices and so may
generate a Passlet from any of those devices. The other devices then would not know
of this Passlet as there is no synchronization mechanism between all the devices.
55
Reeive pPROVIDER
Eb e O NT ------ - from P Session
boses tels fise ases on th  device adslcsteoesh ihst
NO
YES
NYEYE
NO NO
YEO YES
softwa-a-thea Proe id n - t------ ---- ------ eNO 
NO
YES YES
t ePat inefst ------ ----- ------ te Poide te
NO NO
YESYE
YES
Figure 4-9: Establishment of a Passlet Session
The process by which revocation takes place is straightforward. The user simply
browses the list of issued Passlets on the device and selects the one s/he wishes to
revoke. A message that is digitally signed by the user is then sent to the IntuiSec
software at the Provider indicating that the Passlet should be revoked. That user is
by definition an owner of the Provider since otherwise s/he would not have been able
to create the Passlet in the first place. The IntuiSec software at the Provider then
adds the Passlet to a list of revoked Passlets. The bearer of that Passlet can then no
longer access the Provider's functionality through use of that Passlet.
The revoked Passlets list is a non-decreasing list however its space requirements
can be minimized through the use of a unique identifier for each Passlet. This iden-
tifier may be generated through straightforward mechanisms such as hashing the
concatenation of the Passlet's contents with the current system time and a system
hardware identifier of the device on which the Passlet is being generated. If this iden-
tifier were 16 bytes in length then a revocation list of 10,000 Passlets would result in
a 160kB file. Since IntuiSec is to be used in a Smart Home environment, that number
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is far beyond what the system is most likely to handle and so the space requirements
are feasible.
The length of the revoked Passlets list may also be reduced through the use of a
global maximum for the Passlet duration. So for example if the maximum validity
were one year, then all Passlets that are older than one year old would be safe to
remove. IntuiSec could perform a weekly scan of the Passlet list in order to remove
these expired Passlets.
4.5 User Interface - Security API
This part of the system calls for the creation of an API that enables user-level applica-
tions to leverage low level security mechanisms implicitly thereby allowing developers
to focus instead on the functionality of the applications themselves. It also calls for
the leveraging of these API's in order to present the user with a consistent and intu-
itive visualization of security-related aspects of the Smart Home. IntuiSec does not
specify a particular graphical user interface (GUI) to be used; it leaves that to the
application developers. One example of how such visualizations may be presented is
given in Figure 4-10. In this example, the following properties are presented:
1. A house is used to show whether or not the device belongs to the same home
as the user's device.
2. An icon is used to display whether or not the device is owned by the user.
3. A red background indicates an untrusted (i.e. unTAPed) device whereas a green
background indicates a trusted (i.e. TAPed) device.
4. A no-entry sign informs the user that she does not have access to the displayed
device.
It is important to note that the API is constructed such that the same calls may
be made regardless of the underlying security infrastructure. This enables developers
to create a consistent user experience over a variety of underlying security implemen-
tations.
57
F~inter Hnt er
TAP
Green indicates TAPed devices - the user can
trust that they are what they claim to be. Red
indicates unTAPed devices
- Ownership of the discovered device is shown
with a
- A no entry sign indicates that the user has no
access to the device0
- An icon of a house indicates that the device
belongs to the same home as the phonec
Figure 4-10: Security visualizations before and after establishing trust with the fridge
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Chapter 5
Implementation
This chapter describes my implementation of the IntuiSec framework within a sim-
ulated Smart Home environment. The chapter begins within an overview of the
implementation followed by a detailed description of each component of the software
on the various devices.
5.1 Implementation Overview
This section gives an overview of the complete software architecture and the protocols
used in this implementation. These components are detailed in Sections 5.2 - 5.5.
5.1.1 Implementation Functionality and Limitations
The implementation described here provides functionality for all three IntuiSec de-
vice types, namely Mobile, Fixed, and Infrastructure. Mobile Device functionality
is implemented on the Nokia Series 60 2nd Edition Version 2.0 platform. Fixed and
Infrastructure Devices are both implemented on the Linux platform. The implemen-
tation leverages UPnP as the underlying distributed services middleware with existing
third party implementations of UPnP Provider software.
The following functionality is provided in this implementation:
Easy Setup - a process to take ownership of new devices and bootstrap them into
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the home network.
Building Trust - a process by which users can intuitively establish trusted rela-
tionships between devices. This enables the user to securely authenticate and
reliably verify the identity of a remote device.
Granting Access with Passlets - a process by which users can easily grant access
to both home occupants and visitors to devices that they own.
Security Visualization - this consists of a set of API's exposed by the framework to
enable other applications to display security-related parameters in visualizations
meaningful to non-expert users
There are some general points to note about this implementation:
" Mobile Devices are the only Control Points. UPnP Control point functionality is
provided by a third party application on the phones and to demonstrate IntuiSec
it is not necessary to have Control Point functionality on all the devices.
" Public Key cryptography is not used. The necessary cryptographic libraries are
not part of the API's on the Series 60 cellular phones. However, IntuiSec uses
well-established underlying cryptographic protocols and so this is a limitation
of this particular implementation but not of the framework. A side effect of this
is that the Passlets in this implementation are sent as clear text. Again this
does not affect the demonstrability of IntuiSec.
" The UPnP Providers are black-boxes requiring a workaround to provide access
control. Normally, a distributed system with a request/response framework
would leverage the API's exposed by IntuiSec in order to provide access con-
trol. However, in the case of this implementation, UPnP is being retro-fitted
with IntuiSec without the ability to make modifications to the UPnP software.
To address this issue, this implementation of IntuiSec contains a workaround
described in Section 5.1.5
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Figure 5-1: IntuiSec Mobile Device architecture on the Series 60 platform
5.1.2 Mobile Device Architecture
The IntuiSec Mobile Device software is written for the Nokia Series 60 2nd Edition
Version 2.0 platform [49]. It is written in Symbian C++, which is the embedded
environment that runs on Series 60 cellular phones. The main components of the
software are the following, which are also depicted in Figure 5-1:
Easy Setup: A GUI application used to perform the three steps of the Easy Setup
process. This module is discussed in more detail in Section 5.2
Trust Builder: A GUI application used to view already trusted devices and to create
new trusted devices by TAPing. This module is discussed in more detail in
Section 5.3
Passlet Manager: A GUI application used to view Passlets that have been sent,
Passlets that have been received, and to create new Passlets. This module is
discussed in more detail in Section 5.4.
UPnP Control Point: Although not part of IntuiSec itself, this module a modified
UPnP Control Point application that makes use of the IntuiSec API. This appli-
cation is used to interface with the UPnP Providers. This module is discussed
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in more detail in Section 5.5.
IntuiSec Engine: This module exports the IntuiSec API, which is used by the pre-
ceding GUI modules in order to access IntuiSec security functionality. It im-
plements the layer of indirection between the system-level security mechanisms
and the user-level concepts. The various classes that are part of the engine are
all packaged into a DLL file called IntuiSecEngine.dl. When any of the user-level
applications start, they create an instance of the IntuiSec Engine. This provides
them with access to all of the functionality exposed through the IntuiSec API,
which is exported through the IntuiSecEngine.dl file. The full API is given in
Appendix A.
TAPing: This module handles communications over the Infrared channel and im-
plements the TAPing Protocol, which is given in Appendix B. TAPing is im-
plemented over infrared and follows a client/server model. The TAPing module
on Mobile devices has both client and server functionality.
IntuiSec Client: This module handles the client portion of the IntuiSec Client and
Server (ISCS) communications. It communicates over TCP/IP with the In-
tuiSec Server module located on Fixed Devices. The ISCS protocol is given in
full in Appendix C.
IntuiSec DB Manager: This module is responsible for managing the various databases
on the Mobile Device. The databases store information regarding received
Passlets, sent Passlets, and trusted Devices.
5.1.3 Fixed and Infrastructure Device Architecture
The implementation for Fixed and Infrastructure Devices is done on the Linux plat-
form. It is written in Java, however the code that handles the infrared communication
is wrapped around a Java Native Interface (JNI) that is written for native Linux.
Given the appropriate JNI's, it should be possible to run this part of the implemen-
tation on any platform that supports a Java Virtual Machine (JVM), however other
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platforms were not tested. The same code runs on both Infrastructure and Fixed
devices; the software decides at runtime whether it is an Infrastructure Device or a
Fixed Device by reading from a text-based configuration file, an example of which is
given in Appendix D.
The main components of the software are described below and also shown in Figure
5-2. A subset of these components are active when the the device is an Infrastructure
Device as opposed to a Fixed Device and this is shown in Figure 5-3.
Easy Setup: This is a GUI for the Easy Setup process, which presents the user
with a series of dialogs to guide her through the process. The Easy Setup
module implementation for Fixed Devices is similar to that of the Infrastructure
Devices. The only difference is that in the third step of Easy Setup for a
Fixed Device, the software displays a dialog to the user informing her that
she needs to TAP the device with an already bootstrapped Mobile Device (to
obtain the necessary connectivity-level security parameters ). This contrasts
with Infrastructure devices which generate their own sequence of keys that
are then distributed to other Home Devices by TAPing (i.e. no third step is
necessary). This process of key generation is hidden from the user.
System Tray Icon: This is a small icon that resides in the system tray and can be
used to switch the TAPing module on or off.
Engine: This is the main component of the software. It handles the instantiation of
and the communication between the other modules. It also configures the device
appropriately based on startup configuration files and handles the progression
through the Easy Setup process.
IntuiSec Server: This module implements the IntuiSec TCP/IP Server that handles
the communications over the network with the IntuiSec TCP/IP Clients located
on mobile devices that act as Control Points.
TAPing: Handles communications over the infrared channel. The TAPing module
is implemented as a Java wrapper around a JNI to the Linux IrDA stack. It
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Figure 5-2: IntuiSec Fixed Device architecture on the Linux platform
consists of both an IrDA client and an IrDA server.
Passlet DB: This is a store for both valid and revoked Passlets. Valid Passlets are
stored in a hashtable indexed by each Passlet's ProviderlD. This done because
a single IntuiSec device may run more than one UPnP provider, such as the
laptop named COPERNICUS shown in the experimental setup in Figure 5-6.
Revoked Passlets are stored as a list of PassletID's.
5.1.4 TAPing
TAPing is an intuitive user interaction modality that IntuiSec uses to exchange 2-
way messages between devices when the user brings them in close proximity (i.e. the
user "touches" the devices). It is used during Easy Setup, when building trust, and
when handing out Passlets. TAPing is currently implemented using a Client/Server
protocol over Infrared. All devices have a TAP server running on them that listens
for incoming TAPs.
The first step in any TAP is for the devices to exchange their respective HomeIDs.
There is no command for this - the TAPing client sends its HomeID immediately after
64
UPnP Device A
UPnP Device B
UPnPDeviceZ
Unmodified UPnP
Applications and
Middleware
Figure 5-3: IntuiSec Infrastructure Device architecture on the Linux platform
connecting with the TAPing server. The server then responds with its HomeID. If
they do not match then the transaction enters 'unprivileged mode', where certain
requests by the client are not honored by the server. In a real-word implementation
this process would not involve a simple exchange of HomeID's, but rather a challenge-
response protocol such as that prescribed by the design in Section 4.2. A complete
list of the TAP protocol commands is given in Appendix B.
5.1.5 IntuiSec Clients and Servers (ISCS)
This part of the implementation is necessary only because the UPnP components
are black boxes. In some cases the source code was not available, and in others
it was too complex to modify for the purposes of demonstrating IntuiSec. Thus a
workaround consisting of an IntuiSec Client on the Mobile Devices (Control Points)
and an IntuiSec Server on the Fixed Devices (Providers) coordinate to provide the
following functionality. This interaction takes place through the ISCS protocol given
in Appendix C and it is also depicted in 5-4:
1. Establish Passlet sessions.
2. Revoke Passlets.
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Figure 5-4: IntuiSec Client/Server mechanism enforces access control with existing
UPnP and only a slight modification to the standard UPnP Control Point
3. Provide security enhanced device discovery enabling the display of meaningful
security visualizations.
4. Enforce access control.
While this workaround emulates the user experience well, it does not enforce
access control fully. Since the sending of UPnP actions is completely decoupled from
IntuiSec, a standard UPnP Control Point completely bypasses this implementation
of the Intuisec access control mechanism. However, the source code for a UPnP
Control Point on the Series 60 mobile platform was available and the IntuiSec API is
abstracted in such a way that it was straightforward to augment this Control Point
and make it IntuiSec-enabled. This modification is described in more detail in Section
5.5. Note that this workaround is meant to be a temporary solution that allows this
particular implementation to emulate the user experience and is not a part of the
IntuiSec design.
The ideal solution is depicted in Figure 5-5 where the UPnP protocol is in fact
augmented through its Simple Service Discovery Protocol (SSDP) and its Simple
Object Access Protocol (SOAP) in order to provide the security enhanced device
discovery and access control. That way no Control Point can bypass the IntuiSec
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Figure 5-5: IntuiSec Client/Server mechanism integrates with modified UPnP soft-
ware on both the Control Points and the Providers
access control mechanism since it is embedded in the UPnP protocols and handled by
the Providers. Note that Passlets are still handled by the IntuiSec Client and Server.
5.1.6 Experimental Setup
The simulated Smart Home environment consists of a standard D-Link Ethernet
switch, three IBM ThinkPad laptops, and two Nokia 6600 cellular phones. The
layout of the Smart Home is shown in Figure 5-6.
All three laptops run Ubuntu Linux [50], which is a Debian based distribution
[51]. The first laptop uses a D-Link Bluetooth adapter and acts as a Bluetooth access
point for the cell phones to connect to the home network. It also acts as a bridge
between the wired segment and the Bluetooth segment. The second laptop acts as
both a simulated Media Renderer and a Media Server, whilst the third laptop acts
as a simulated Printer. Both these laptops run software implementations of UPnP
devices created using the free Intel Authoring Tools from [52]. The cell phones both
run the Nokia Series 60 2nd Edition Version 2.0 operating system [49], which is based
on Symbian OS 7.Os [53]. All the devices except the Ethernet switch have Infrared
connectivity. The various roles and owners of the devices are summarized in Table
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Figure 5-6: IntuiSec implementation experimental setup
5.1.
5.2 Easy Setup
The implementation allows for the bootstrapping of Mobile, Fixed, and Infrastructure
devices into the Smart Home. After the Easy Setup process, a device is able to connect
securely over Bluetooth or 802.11 without the need for the user to deal with Bluetooth
PINs or WEP keys. The user interaction sequence is described next followed by an
explanation of the application control flow during the process.
5.2.1 User Interaction View
The Easy Setup process on Mobile Devices consists of three ordered steps that are
performed by the user. Screenshots of the Easy Setup application running on the
Nokia 6600 mobile phones are given in Figure 5-7:
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IBM ThinkPad 570E
Ubuntu Linux
192.168.5.3
,,
Device Name IntuiSec Device UPnP Device Owner
Type Type
ARISTOTELIS Infrastructure N/A DIMI
(Laptop)
COPERNICUS (Lap- Fixed Providers (Media DIMI
top) Server + Media
Renderer)
MAXIMUS (Laptop) Fixed Provider (Printer) SAAD
SAAD Phone Mobile Control Point SAAD
VISITOR Phone Mobile Control Point VISITOR
Ethernet Switch N/A N/A N/A
Table 5.1: Experimental setup - device roles and owners
Step 1: Input ownership information in the form of a username and password.
Step 2: Assign the home ID through insertion of the PhyKey - currently an MMC card
as this is what the Nokia 6600 phones support.
Step 3: Retrieve connectivity information by TAPing an already set up Infrastructure
Device.
The Easy Setup process on Fixed Devices also consists of three ordered steps that
are performed by the user. Screenshots of the Easy Setup application running on the
Linux Laptops are given in Figure 5-8:
Step 1: Input ownership information in the form of a username and password.
Step 2: Assign the home ID through insertion of the PhyKey - currently an MMC card
through a USB MMC reader to maintain consistency with the process on the
Nokia cell phones.
Step 3: Retrieve connectivity information by using an already set up Mobile Device to
TAP the Fixed Device.
The Easy Setup process on Infrastructure Devices is identical to that of Fixed
Devices except that the third step is not needed since the Infrastructure Device gen-
erates its own sequence of keys that are then handed out to other Home Devices when
they are set up.
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Figure 5-7: User's view of performing Easy Setup on a Mobile Device - the Nokia
6600 cell phone
5.2.2 System View
On the Mobile Devices, the Easy Setup application uses the first six functions of the
IntuiSec API given in Appendix A. The application control flow is described by the
activity diagram in Figure 5-9. The UML sequence diagrams in Figures 5-10 and 5-11
show the TAPing portion (Step 3) in more detail highlighting the difference between
an attempt by a Home Device to perform Easy Setup and a Visitor Device. Note
that information obtained during each step of the process is stored in files. This
includes the OwnerID, HomeID, and the list of connectivity keys. The middleware
probes for the existence of these files to determine which step of the process it is
at in case the user does not complete the whole process at one sitting. In Step 3
of the process after the connectivity information is received from the access point,
the middleware automatically creates a Bluetooth pairing in the pairing database on
the Mobile Device and inserts the first of the list of Bluetooth keys as the current
Bluetooth Link Key. This enables the Mobile Device to connect securely to the access
point without any further configuration from the user. The rest of the keys are stored
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Figure 5-8: User's view of performing Easy Setup on a Fixed Device - the IBM laptop
acting as a printer
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in a file. There is a function that extracts the next 16-byte key from the file and uses
it to replace the current link key in the pairing database thereby implementing the
key-rotation mechanism. Note here that the actual link keys are used rather than the
user-level secrets (which are PINs for Bluetooth) as described in the design in Section
4.2.1. This is because the standard Series 60 method for establishing a Bluetooth
pairing is through presenting the user with a popup to manually enter a PIN. There
is no way to programmatically set this PIN and the only way to suppress the popup
is to create a pairing in the Bluetooth database, which can be done programmatically
by inserting a shared link key between the mobile device and the access point.
The implementation for Fixed and Infrastructure Devices on Linux is function-
ally equivalent to that of the Mobile Devices. One difference is that on Fixed and
Infrastructure Devices, IntuiSec uses a configuration file upon initialization. This
configuration file contains information that is used to determine the properties of the
device, such as whether it is a Fixed or an Infrastructure Device in addition to data
specific to each type of device. This way the same software can be run on either
type of device. In the case of a Fixed Device the file contains information about all
the UPnP Providers on that device. This is necessary for IntuiSec to become aware
of the UPnP Providers on that device since the UPnP Provider software is unmod-
ified and does not initiate any communication with IntuiSec. An example IntuiSec
configuration file is given in Appendix D.
Serialization
Since the implementation is done in various programming languages on different plat-
forms, it is necessary to have a conversion between language-specific abstract data
types and globally comprehensible network objects. This occurs through a serial-
ization mechanism that transforms these objects into the form [<lengthl> <fieldi>
<length2> <field2>. . . <lengthN> <fieldN>] where <lengthl>. . . <lengthN> are 4-
byte integers representing the total length of the corresponding fields <fieldi>... <fieldN>
that follow. One example of such a serialized object is the serialized-conn-inf o
object depicted as part of the sequence diagrams in Figure 5-10. Besides connectivity
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Figure 5-9: Activity Diagram of the Easy Setup process on Series 60 phones
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Figure 5-11: Sequence Diagram showing an unauthorized attempt at obtaining con-
nectivity information during Step 3 of the Easy Setup process
information, the other abstract data types are the trusted device information and
Passlets. The process of serialization for all data types is identical. The three data
types and their internal attributes are listed in Appendix E
5.3 Trust Builder
5.3.1 User Interaction View
The user interaction process with the Trust Builder application is straightforward.
The user selects the "Build Trust" option after which she is asked to TAP the device
she wishes to build trust with. Once the TAP is complete, the device appears in the
user's trusted devices list. This process is shown in Figure 5-12
5.3.2 System View
The Trust Builder Series 60 application uses GetTrustedDevices() to obtain a list
of trusted devices and uses that list to populate a display of those devices. The
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Figure 5-12: User interaction with the Trust Builder application on the Nokia 6600
user may opt to delete a device from the database, in which case the application
calls DeleteTrustedDevice (). If a user wishes to build trust with a new device,
she selects "Build Trust" from the options menu and then she is asked to TAP the
device she wishes to build trust with. Analogous to the Easy Setup retrieval of
connectivity information, the Engine creates an instance of the IRClient and calls
GetDeviceInfo () . The IRClient then proceeds to retrieve the device information
by using the GETDEVICEINFO command of the TAPing protocol. The IRServer
on the side of the Fixed Device then responds with the device information of every
UPnP provider that is running on that device. It obtains this information from the
configuration file described in Section 5.2.2. The complete process is illustrated by
the sequence diagram in Figure 5-13
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Figure 5-13: Sequence diagram showing the process of building trust
5.4 Passlet Manager
5.4.1 User Interaction View
The implementation of Passlets along with the Passlet Manager application creates
a user experience identical to that which is described in Section 4.4. The Passlet
Manager application contains three tabs. The first lists Passlets that the user has
sent with some information about each, such as the device which it is for, the time
until expiry, and the recipient. The second lists Passlets that the user has received
with some information about each, such as the time until expiry, the device which
it is for, and the user who generated the Passlet. The third tab displays devices
that the user owns and has TAPed. These are the devices which the user is able to
generate Passlets for. Since a core component of Passlets is the ability to incorporate
trusted authentication information pertaining to the device which a Passlet is allowing
access to, it is necessary for the user to first TAP the device in order to obtain that
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information.
The steps a user takes to create and send a passlet are shown in Figures 5-14 and
5-15. These figures show Saad using his mobile phone to generate and grant a Passlet
to Dimitris for use of his printer. Note that the user interaction process is the same
regardless of whether the recipient is a visitor or a home occupant. The middleware
automatically includes the necessary connectivity information for a Visitor Device as
described in Section 5.4.2.
5.4.2 System View
Control flow is handed from the Passlet Manager application to the IntuiSec Engine
and then to the IRClient. The following pseudocode describes the execution of the
first two modules. The TAPing procedure performed by the IRClient is then shown
in more detail in Figures 5-16 and 5-17. Note that in the case of handing a Passlet
to a visitor, the connectivity information is sent separately however this is merely to
simplify the implementation. In the design, connectivity information is incorporated
into the internals of each Passlet.
PassletManager: :CreatePasslet {
display.owned-devices;
display-def ault-passlet-template-f or (selected-device-type)
passlet = Passlet. create-passlet-from-user-params;
IntuiSecEngine.SendPasslet(passlet);
}
IntuiSecEngine: :SendPasslet(passlet) {
passlet.ownerID = this.get-owner-ido;
passlet.passletID = generatepasslet-ido;
IRClient . SendPasslet (passlet);
}
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Figure 5-16: Sequence diagram showing
a Home Device
the TAPing segment of sending a Passlet to
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Figure 5-17: Sequence diagram showing the TAPing segment of sending a Passlet to
a Visitor Device
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Figure 5-18: Application view of Dimitris using his mobile phone to browse the home
network with and without security visualizations
5.5 IntuiSec-enabled Control Point
5.5.1 User Interaction View
After interacting with the system and the various devices in the home, a user is able to
view the results of these interactions through certain security visualizations. These
visualizations are displayed when a user explores the home network and browses
for devices within the home. This implementation uses UPnP as the underlying
device discovery and control framework. Figure 5-18 shows views of the Control
Point application with and without the security visualizations.
5.5.2 System View
The IntuiSec-enabled Control Point application is augmented to provide both security
enhanced device discovery and access control functionality.
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Figure 5-19: Sequence diagram showing how the Control Point application obtains
the security parameters from the various UPnP providers in order to display the
relevant visualizations to the user
Security Enhanced Device Discovery
The IntuiSec-enabled Control Point application performs a regular UPnP discovery
and for each response from a Provider that it receives it makes a separate API call
to GetSecParams 0. This process is shown in the sequence diagram in Figure 5-19.
When this function completes it returns a 4-byte that indicates:
1. Whether or not the user making the request owns the device on which the dis-
covered Provider resides. Recall that a single IntuiSec device may run multiple
UPnP Providers, such as the laptop named COPERNICUS in the experimental
setup described in Section 5.1.6 which has both a Media Renderer and a Media
Server.
2. Whether or not the device making the request and the device on which the
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discovered Provider resides both belong to the same home.
3. Whether or not the user making the request has access to the discovered Provider.
This is determined either through the possession of a valid Passlet to or through
ownership of the remote Provider.
4. Whether or not the discovered device is a trusted device - trust having been
established through the Trust Builder application.
It is important to note that the IntuiSec software on the Fixed Device which
hosts the Providers is responsible for translating between UPnP identification strings
(known Unique Device Names or UDNs) and IntuiSec's ProviderIDs. The IntuiSec
software on a Fixed Device becomes aware of the UDNs of all the Providers that
are running on that Fixed Device through the IntuiSec configuration file described
in Section 5.2.2 and given in Appendix D. Once the ProviderID is sent back to the
IntuiSec Client making the request, the client can then proceed to check whether or
not the user has a Passlet for the specified device and whether the device is trusted
or not.
Access Control
After device discovery has been performed, the user normally selects the device s/he
wishes to access. Upon selection, the Control Point application retrieves the UPnP
device description from the remote Provider and displays the appropriate control view
to the user. The available user-level actions in the control view vary depending on
the control functionality of the device that is chosen. So a printer for example would
display 'Print', 'Delete Job', etc. whereas a media server would display 'Upload',
'Download', etc. When the user selects an action to perform, the Control Point
application automatically translates that user-level action into the necessary sequence
of UPnP SOAP actions, which individually are not meaningful on a user level. Instead
of automatically performing this translation however, the IntuiSec-enabled Control
Point application first checks to see if the user has access to the given action through
a call to the GetActions() function that is part of the IntuiSec API. This function
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retrieves a comma separated list of user-level actions that the user- is allowed to
perform on the Provider. If the user has access to the given action, then the regular
UPnP SOAP communications ensue. Otherwise the user is notified that s/he does
not have access.
The list of actions that is retrieved from the Provider will vary depending on the
situation:
1. If the user is the owner of the Provider, then the list of actions will be a complete
list of all available user-level actions because the owner by default has access to
all the functionality on the Provider.
2. If the user is not the owner but has a Passlet for which there is an already
established Passlet session with the Provider, then the list of actions will consist
of all allowed actions specified in the Passlet.
3. If the user is not the owner and does not have a Passlet session established
yet but is in possession of a Passlet, then the IntuiSec Client first posts the
Passlet using the PASSLET command described in Appendix C. After posting
the Passlet a session is established and communication proceeds as in case 2.
4. If the user is not the owner and does not have a Passlet to access the device or
a valid Passlet session, then list of actions will be an empty list and the user
will not have access to any of the functionality on the Provider.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Directions
6.1 Discussion of Results
This thesis began with an illustration of the clear need to readdress the design of
current security frameworks. I claimed that most current frameworks are inadequate
not in their cryptographic correctness, but in their lack of focus on the users who are
going to use these frameworks. As a solution to this problem I presented IntuiSec,
which is a security framework for Smart Home environments with a unique focus on
usability. I showed how this framework is intuitive and implicit in its functionality
enabling average users to avoid getting caught up in the intricacies of cryptographic
mechanisms. In the design I demonstrated how IntuiSec enables users to easily in-
corporate new devices securely into the Smart Home environment in three simple
steps, how users can build trusted relationships between different devices by simply
touching them, how they may grant access to other home occupants and visitors
also using touch, and how they can intuitively visualize the security-related aspects
of the Smart Home environment. Most importantly IntuiSec presents the user with
this consistent interaction regardless of the underlying cryptographic mechanism, be
it 802.11 with WEP or WPA, Bluetooth PINs, or a variety of other connectivity
security implementations.
I later presented a working instantiation of IntuiSec using both the Nokia Series
60 and the Linux platforms within a simulated Smart Home environment. The imple-
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mentation demonstrates both the efficaciousness and feasibility of the functionality
described in the design of IntuiSec.
6.2 Future Directions
IntuiSec is clearly a large step forward in the design of security frameworks for complex
environments that are meant to be managed by non-technical users. Nevertheless,
there is still room for much research in this field. One interesting area would be to
extend IntuiSec to situations where the user is outside their home environment but
wishes to access functionality within the home. Remote access is becoming increas-
ingly important because as homes provide more functionality en route to becoming
Smart Homes, individuals are increasingly feeling the need to control and observe
their homes from anywhere. This may be done through some form of Virtual Pri-
vate Network (VPN) or secure tunneling. One challenge with VPN's is appropriately
handling NAT traversal. Also current VPN's are difficult to configure and a new
abstraction similar to those presented in this thesis could be used to create a more
usable experience.
In the longer run it is also necessary to consider how users will interact with
security frameworks outside of their homes - in their offices, in hotels, in airports, and
other locations. In public spaces, usability is extremely important due to the lack of
readily available technical support. The security requirements of public spaces are
also different than those of Smart Homes since public spaces are more susceptible to
physical attacks (both wired and wireless). In the enterprise, tech support is available
however businesses would save a lot on their help desk expenses by having a more
usable security framework in the office. They would also improve the security of
sensitive corporate material and the productivity of their employees who would be
able to focus entirely on getting their jobs done rather than dealing with intricate
security measures that many times simply get in the way. It should be feasible to
extract the consistent principles used by IntuiSec and apply them to the state of
ubiquitous connectivity that we will experience in the near future.
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Appendix A
IntuiSec Engine API
89
API Function Description Used By
Checks to see if an owner has already been assigned to this device.
OwnerInfoAlreadySet? () Easy Setup - Step I
Creates a new owner for the device.
CreateOwner (username, password)
Checks to see if the device has already been assigned a homeID.
HomeIDAireadySet? ()
Reads the Home Secret from the MMC card and assigns it to this device. Easy Setup - Step 2
AssignHomeSecretFromMMC ()
Checks to see if the device has already received connectivity information to
connect to the home network.
BluetoothKeysAlreadyReceived? Easy Setup - Step 3
Gets connectivity information by TAPing and creates a Bluetooth pairing
and the bluetoothkeys.bin file.
GetConnectivityInfo ()
Retrieves a list of trusted devices.
GetTrustedDevices ()
Gets Trusted Provider information through a TAP. Trust Builder
GetProviderInfo ()
Deletes the specified device from the Trusted Devices database.
DeleteTrustedDevice (deviceID)
Retrieves a list of the passlets the current user has received. Passlet Manager -
GetPassletsReceived () Received Passlets
Retrieves a list of the passlets the current user has given out.
GetPassLetsGiven ()
Passlet Manager - Sent
Sends a revocation message for the specified passlet to the device at the Passlets
specified address.
RevokePasslet (deviceID, passletID)
Retrieves a list of devices that the current user owns and has TAPed.
GetOwnedDevices ()
Passlet Manager -
Sends the given passlet through a TAP and inserts it into the Sent Passlets Create Passlet
database if successful.
SendPasslet (passlet)
Gets the security parameters for the device with the specified UDN at the
specified IP address.
GetSecParams (IPAddress, UDN) UPnP Control Point
Gets the list of user-level actions that the user has permission to use on the Application
given device.
GetActions (IPAddress, UDN)
Figure A-1: IntuiSec API
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Appendix B
IntuiSec TAP Protocol
GET_CONNECTIVITYJNFO: If the device making the request is authorized
after exchanging the HomeID, the receiver of the request transfers the serialized
connectivity information to the requestor. This command is sent as part of the
Easy Setup process.
GETDEVICEINFO: Gets information about all UPnP Providers residing on the
Fixed Device as a DeviceInfo object in its serialized form. The information con-
sists of the ProviderlD, OwnerID, HomeID, ProviderName, and ProviderType.
The last parameter corresponds to the UPnP Provider type and is used to
display an icon as part of the Trust Builder application.
GET-USERJD: Gets the UserID of the currently active user on the remote device.
Since the current implementation only handles single user devices, this in effect
returns the OwnerlD of the remote device.
PASSLET <Passlet>: Sends a serialized Passlet to the TAPed device. The Passlets
are sent in plain text and consist of: UserID, ProviderID, DeviceName, Expiry-
Time, Permissions, and ProviderType. The ProviderType corresponds to the
UPnP Provider type (e.g. Printer or Renderer) and is used to display an icon
as part of the Passlet Manager application.
CONNECTIVITYINFO <conninfo>: Sends connectivity information from a
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Home Device to a Visitor Device after a Passlet has been sent to that device. As
described in Section 4.4.2, a Passlet given to a visitor incorporates additional
connectivity information. Thus this command is only used in the case where a
device is sending a Passlet to a visitor device. After comparing the home IDs
in the beginning, the IRClient infers that the other device is a visitor device.
Then after sending the Passlet over with the PASSLET command, the client
sends a CONNECTIVITYINFO command to indicate that it is about to send
over connectivity information as well. This contains only one key (as opposed
to a list of 100 keys that a home device receives when it gets the connectivity
info from an access point).
UNAUTHORIZED: Sent when a visitor device attempts to perform an action
that only home devices are authorized to perform. Currently the only time this
occurs is when a visitor device attempts to retrieve connectivity information
from a home infrastructure device.
ERROR: Signals that an error occurred.
OK: Indicates that a command was processed without error.
CLOSE: Terminates the TAP.
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Appendix C
ISCS Protocol
PASSLET <Passlet>: Used when the IntuiSec Client wishes to present a Passlet
to be posted to the IntuiSec server. The Passlet is a Passlet in its serialized
form. Returns an OK if the post was successful, otherwise returns ERROR (if
it was revoked).
REVOKE <ProviderID, PassletlD>: Used when the client wishes to present a
Passlet to be revoked by the server. The ProviderlD is that of the device for
which the Passlet was generated - this makes searching for the relevant Passlet
faster in the case where there are many Providers running on the same physical
device and so being managed by the same IntuiSec Server. Returns an OK if
the revocation was successful.
GET.SECPARAMS <UserID, HomeID, UDN>: Sent from the client to the
server to retrieve the security parameters. The first 3 bytes of the response are:
" Whether or not the user is the owner of the device (if true then 1, else 0).
" Whether or not the device making the request is part of the same home
(if true then 1, else 0).
" Whether or not the user has a valid Passlet to access the specified device
(if true then 1, else 0).
The next 16 bytes contain the ProviderlD of the device with the specified UDN.
93
This is so that the remote device that made the request can perform the final
check, which is whether or not the Provider is on a trusted device.
GETACTIONS <UserID, UDN>: Returns a list of semi-colon separated user-
level actions that the user is permitted to perform on the specified device. These
actions represent high-level, user-perceived functionality and each of them is
usually mapped to a number of SOAP-level actions.
ERROR: Signals that an error occurred.
OK: Indicates that a command was processed without error.
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Appendix D
Example intuisec.config file
// This is the configuration file for a device. It is
// formatted with the use of structures. A structure
// consists of a multi-line segment that starts with a tag.
// The INF tag is used for infrastructure devices. It is
// followed by three lines, the first contains the hardware
// address of the network interface using standard
// hexadecimal separated by colons. The second contains
// the name of the infrastructure device. The third
// contains its connectivity type, currently either
// Bluetooth or 802.11.
// The DEV tag is used for Fixed Devices. It is followed
// by four lines. The first is the ProviderID; the second
// is the name of the device; the third is the device type
// which is only used for clients to display appropriate
// icons; the fourth is the UPnP Provider UDN
// Here is an example of the two structures that are
// available.
// INF:
// 00:OF:3D:38:EC:FC (Hardware address)
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// Aristotelis (Device Name)
// Bluetooth (Connectivity Type)
//
// DEV:
// devicel (ProviderID)
// Saad's Printer (Device Name)
// 3 (Device Type)
// 8c073f14-1499-4050-80fe-937dcddf5454 (UDN)
//
// Types of devices:
// Media Server = 1
// AV Renderer = 2
// Printer = 3
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Appendix E
Abstract Data Types
Connectivity Information
1. Infrastructure Device Name
2. MAC Address
3. Connectivity Type (Bluetooth/802.11)
4. Link Keys
Trusted Device Information
1. ProviderID
2. Provider Name
3. HomelD
4. OwnerID
5. Device Type (for icon display)
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Passlet
1. UserID
2. User Name
3. ProviderID
4. Provider Name
5. Expiry Time
6. Permissions
7. Device Type (for icon display)
8. PassletID
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